2 dez. Economia do setor público no Brasil by Ciro Biderman, , Elsevier, Editora Campus, FGV, EAESP edition, in Portuguese. In: Paulo Arvate; Ciro Biderman. (Org.). Economia do Setor Público no Brasil. 1ed .Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, , v. 1, p. | 𝗥𝗲𝗾𝘂𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗣𝗗𝗙 on. Arvate Biderman Economia do Setor Publico no Brasil 10 Copia pdf. 3Pages: 3. Thermo solution manual. 0Pages: 0.
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Economia Do Setor Público No Brasil - organizadores Ciro Biderman e Paulo Arvate - Cap. 10 - Texto Download as PDF or read online from Scribd. Flag for . volume economia do setor Público no. Brasil CIRO BIDERMAN: In Brazil, as in most of Latin america, there is a lack of research in. CEPESP_Barberia; tingrakecoupde.ml (Kb) Local economic development policies have surged in Brazil over the past decade—a major shift in this regionally.
Civil society mobilizes and connects to government at the local and national level, contributing to activate the accountability system and achieve better results in terms of information, justification, reward, and punishment. This is not homogeneous among the various municipalities. Although the same institutional and methodological resources are available, the degree of engagement, the profile of those involved, and the quality of relationships between agents in each context influences accountability.
The analysis of three cities stresses that, for establishing co-production of information and control, it is crucial that, besides the engagement of civil society, there are public servants open to dialogue and co-production along with the society, in order to facilitate and open communication channels between institutional control and social control. It was observed in some situations that public servants, who know the control system and face constraints to change them from inside out, often seek observatories as a strategy to act.
This research, conducted in three cities, highlights the importance of co-production of information and control, the influence of social control to activate the institutional control system, and the effects of interactions between government and community in defining the kind of accountability that each city is able to build.
This reinforces the assumption that the continuous and dynamic interaction between agencies of institutional control, particularly when co-production is organically connected to the process, tends to produce better outcomes Accountability and co-production of information and control Rev.
Finally, we may claim that the development of accountability is an ongoing process in Brazil, and experiences such as the network SOB and the three cities under analysis contribute to boost this process. Therefore, even when continuity and institutionalization are not achieved, these experiences enable the observatories to learn how to activate the system of institutional control and be more effective in their work. In this way, they find out system operation details and build ties with civil servants who value control as a public good co- produced through an interaction between the State apparatus and citizens.
Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier; Campus, Toward a definition of the coproduction concept. Public Administration Review, v. Organizations unfettered: organizational form in an informa- tion-intensive economy. Academy of Management Journal, v.
Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Sobre el Desarrollo. Access on: 4 Aug. As a result, the problem of the federation structure is not only a matter of a clash regarding the competence of each level of government, or the difficulty to coordinate them.
It is also the increase in the number of actors in the decision-making process since the division of power must also consider regional cleavages. In this way, despite the initial positive expectations regarding the political control of the bureaucracy due to the adoption of a presidential regime, and the centrality of the executive in the Brazilian political system, it is possible to see that there are some obstacles imposed by the dynamics of management of the government coalition.
In the Brazilian system, the president must deal with very heterogeneous multi-party actors, and they need to consider the internal cleavages within parties and the regional differences reinforced by the federation structure. Because of the permeability of the executive in other entities of the federation, whether for budgetary matters, policy implementation or even for electoral support, the president needs to dialogue with political leaders in multiple arenas.
Given this scenario, how can the president exercise control over such a heterogeneous cabinet in a political system with such complex dynamics? The following sections present a discussion on some of the main strategies adopted by presidents to overcome the adversities imposed by the configuration of the Brazilian institutional arrangement. The president has authority to appoint positions in the administration, and this is used as a strategy to exercise control informally and personally since most of the positions of free appointment do not need to be ratified by the Senate and is not subject to formal opposition by the legislative branch.
Based on the North American case, Lewis presents a series of possible explanations for increasing the executive control over appointments.
Among them is the increase in the number of government programs, which of course would require greater control. Also, increasing appointments could make it easier for agencies to act according to the preferences of the president and the majority of Congress in majoritarian governments since a higher number of nominees would be a further guarantee that the institution would be in line with the proposed guidelines.
Ideological factors or even patronage opportunities that benefit members of the Congress and parties would be explanations for the observed increase in appointments. This expansion of bureaucracy, together with greater economic stability in the country, has an impact on patronage strategies as it expands the resources available for political bargaining to consolidate a support base. When these appointments are a result of patronage and are carried out under the influence of multiple heterogeneous actors, what could work as a control mechanism, ends up being another obstacle in the management of public policies.
As for the positives, there are benefits in appointments, such as the freedom to indicate professionals who have specific managerial skills to conduct certain activities.
These professionals would have, in a certain way, a differentiated attitude towards the career civil servants. They are more likely to take risks and, consequently, increase the capacity of innovation in the area in which they were allocated.
In this scenario, there would be gains regarding the quality of the policies implemented.
On the other hand, as negative impacts, there would be a decrease in transparency and the consequent difficulty of control over the appointed positions. The excessive politicization of bureaucracy can generate low-performing teams, because of the low expertise and technical qualifications required to fill these positions.
Another relevant issue, related to the quality of the deliveries of the agencies, is the rotation of positions, which undermines the knowledge management in the ministries and can generate resistance of the career civil servants to act according to the guidelines established. The issue of low performance, however, is not consensus. In this way, the evaluation of the performance of these actors could be broken down into more than one dimension, not only the dimension of results obtained by each agency, but also the management of inter-ministerial connections, and the monitoring of the president over the ministers to maintain stability coalition, which is discussed in the next section.
It should be emphasized that an appointee will not always have an impact on the results of the policies. This impact is conditioned to other aspects such as the number of appointees, the opening of agencies or governmental bodies for external influence, the asymmetry of information between the appointee and career civil servant, as well as the degree in which the president controls the appointments LEWIS, In Brazil, Santos says that the political appointment of positions would not necessarily reflect clientelistic practices that would reduce the efficiency of the administration.
The author says that the absence of criteria for appointments and of formal controls on these positions results in a level of discretion much superior to other democracies SANTOS, In this sense, the formalization of criteria and the establishment of mechanisms for transparent evaluation and control is a fundamental aspect for an efficient management of public policies, especially considering the scenario of bureaucratization of politics and politicization of bureaucracy, in which both political and bureaucratic actors increasingly act like policymakers LOUREIRO and ABRUCIO, Moreover, the appointment process does not guarantee performance, and it is not conducted exclusively by the president.
Moreover, considering the complexity of the coalition, the higher will be the efforts to exercise control in alignment with the will of the president. With this in mind, some of the key strategies related to appointments to form the cabinet are listed below. According to the author, the stability in the cabinet is essential so that the ministers consolidate their credibility and authority before the bureaucracy, establishing relations of control and accountability.
The expertise building is central, as continuity in the mandate allows the minister to build this background, reinforcing the earlier aspects of credibility and authority, further expanding their capacity for control over the bureaucratic apparatus.
Offices with ministers belonging to parties tend to be more stable. Also, an excessive number of ministerial portfolios could negatively impact stability due to the difficulty of cooperation and the overlapping of competencies. Based on the theory of agent-principal delegation, there is a chain of distribution of competencies from the president to ministers, from ministers to another member of the executive branch in other levels, and so on.
It is common to see them in processes of negotiation with the National Congress and the construction of legislation, as well as the design and implementation of public policies, as discussed previously. Not all Ministers, however, will play a central role in government and, likewise, not all control mechanisms will be available to all of them.
Huber emphasizes some control strategies that can be undertaken by ministers, such as: ex ante control ministerial guidelines and ordinances , ex post control routine monitoring and judicial control , budget constraints working as ex ante and ex post and also the possibility of the bureaucracy politicization or high influence of political parties.
Huber defines politicization as permitting civil servants to join political parties, which can lead to problems of coordination depending on the ideological positioning of the government.
However, the politicization of bureaucracy can be understood not only as party belonging but as the political appointment of outsiders to occupy the positions. Also, not all ministers appointed are chosen by the president, which increases the incentives for the president to implement monitoring strategies, such as appointing personnel subordinated to the ministers.
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Their authority has expanded so they may appoint personnel to other positions that assist in monitoring the bureaucratic apparatus. This strategy also promotes the influence of political parties and the politicization of bureaucracy in favor of the president. The high-level of influence of the political parties is an important control strategy observed not only in Brazil, where the secretaries work as supervisors or watchdogs of the president.
In a study on the appointments of secretaries in Brazil, Pereira, Cad.
Cap. 10 - Teoria da Tributação Ótima - Economia do Setor Público no Brasil - Biderman e Arvate
The fiscal profile can be both political-party related and bureaucratic. In any case, an executive with a fiscal profile can be crucial in controlling bureaucracy at the first level of delegation in the delegation chain, ensuring alignment with the presidential proposals and monitoring the action of ministers who may be more ideologically distant from the chief of the executive branch.
The appointment of a fiscal executive secretary is also influenced by the level of coalescence of the offices. The more monopolistic or disproportionate the distribution of ministries among the governing parties, the smaller the efforts to control ministries of other parties. Here we observe a possible advantage of the party influence for the control of the bureaucracy regarding the quality of policies produced.
Finally, the technical profile can be characterized by a bureaucratic assistant or bureaucratic sharing. In the latter, both minister and secretary do not belong to any party. It is possible to identify that top positions in the cabinet are not usually occupied by career civil servants, but rather by appointees. This practice could create bureaucratic fragility due to the instability of guidelines and constant turnover, but this scenario of vulnerability is not confirmed by the findings of Loureiro and Abrucio when studying the Ministry of Finance.
The authors showed that, at least in priority areas, there is a specific insulation of the bureaucracy regarding changes in the political context. However, excessive control through the appointment of executive secretaries who would act as supervisors may be a problem, as this situation limits the autonomy of ministers and may affect the quality of the public policies produced, as well as create tensions in the management of the coalition.
Control as an instrument for promoting accountability has been a significant concern to scholars researching democratic institutions.
Considering its importance to the development of democracy, studying the obstacles posed to controlling bureaucracy and how to circumvent these difficulties are extremely relevant in political science and public administration studies. In the analysis of the Brazilian political system it is possible to observe that, despite the existence of institutional characteristics that theoretically favored the political control of the bureaucracy — such as the presidential regime, the centrality of the executive and low external control exercised by the legislative — the country still faces significant challenges regarding the promotion of accountability.
Among them, stand out the hybrid nature of Brazilian presidentialism and the dynamics of coalition management required by robust federalism and a multiparty system.
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This complex scenario increases the number of actors in the decision-making process and sharing control responsibilities, making it difficult to identify a principal in the authority delegation chain, and burdening the monitoring processes.
To ensure the functioning of this arrangement, presidential strategies vary, seeking to balance the dilemma of governability that comes from the distribution of power and from the bureaucratic insulation that is needed in the most central areas of government.
The impact of these control strategies on the performance of the public administration is not consensual, but the great discretion and the reduced formal controls on these mechanisms make it hard to assess the control of the Brazilian bureaucracy and its respective outputs.
In this sense, it is necessary to consider not only the number of appointments but the origin of the nominees and their possible links with national or regional political leadership. Also, investigating the nature of the agencies and which policies are most subject to political capture would be of great value to scholars and policymakers. Bureaucrats and Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Australian v. Journal of Public Administration, v.
Bureaucrats and democracy: a critical appraisal.
Comparative Politics, v. Cambridge: Harvard University p. Press, Economia E. Rio de Janeiro: Campus Elsevier, American Development Bank, The institutional foundations of democratic do debate e apontamentos para uma nova agenda de pesquisa. Revista government: a comparison of presidential and parliamentary systems.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, v. Gabinetes presidenciais, ciclos eleitorais e disciplina p. Dados, v. Revista de n. COX, G. In: , Political appointments and administrativa en america latina. Latin America, v. Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies. Ambition, federalism and legislative politics in Brazil.
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Electoral rules and constitutional structures as constraints on corruption. Presidential appointments and personnel. Annual Review of Political Science, v.In this sense, the federative structure and the multiparty system act as aggravating factors in this scenario and lead the executive to adopt various informal strategies of control over the bureaucracy.
Beyond the state: Finally, after reviewing and discussing the dynamics of the Brazilian political system, the article offers examples of strategies adopted by the president to exercise political control over the bureaucracy of the cabinet and overcome the obstacles imposed by the institutional arrangement in force in the country.
Instituto Nacional de Administracion Publica, There is a concentration of control mechanisms in this agent, which will be discussed in the following sections. Constitutionalism, international law and global governance. American Political Science Review,vol.